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Abstract: This paper introduces a model for evidence denial that explains this 
behavior as a manifestation of rationality, and it is based on the contention that 
social values (measurable as utilities) often underwrite these sorts of responses. 
Moreover, it contends that the value associated with group membership in par-
ticular can override epistemic reason when the expected utility of a belief or 
belief system is great. It is also true, however, that it appears to be the case that it 
is still possible for such unreasonable believers to reverse this sort of dogmatism 
and to change their beliefs in a way that is epistemically rational. The conjecture 
made here is that we should expect this to happen only when the expected utility 
of the beliefs in question dips below a threshold where the utility value of con-
tinued dogmatism and the associated group membership is no longer sufficient 
to motivate defusing the counterevidence that tells against such epistemically 
irrational beliefs.
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Introduction
Traditionally it has been assumed that people who harbor false beliefs 
can, at least in principle, be rationally persuaded to correct those beliefs 
through the use of reason. This importantly involves the assumption that 
presenting such people with evidence that tells against false beliefs they 
harbor will bring this about, provided they cooperate and want to have 
(by and large) true beliefs.1 In other words, the traditional view is that 
1 For critical discussion of the orthodox notion of rationality see Brown (1988), Cohen 
(1981 and 1982), Stein (1996), Cherniak (1986), Stich (1990), Piatelli-Palmarini (1994), 
Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky (1982), Kahneman and Tversky (1996), Gigerenzer (2000), 
and Manktelow (2012). The problem discussed here involves the idea that the principles of 
rationality are normative and that they specify how we ought to reason. This, of course, then 
involves the possibility that we might choose to reason in ways that violate those principles. 
But this, in turn, involves a slight complication as the issue of voluntarism about commit-
ment (for example, belief, acceptance, and so on) formation, since this is a controversial 
matter. Nevertheless, for practical reasons, the main points made here are approached in 
terms of the assumption of doxastic voluntarism, although the same point can be made in a 
bit more complicated way with respect to an involuntarist notion of rational commitment. 
Concerning such voluntarism/involuntarism about propositional commitments see Alston 
(1988), Cohen (1992), Steup (1986 and 2000), and Shaffer (2013 and 2017).
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epistemic agents are rational and reflectively responsive to evidence. It 
has recently become increasingly clear, however, that this may not be 
generally true, and this skeptical conclusion is supported by a growing 
number of important empirical results, including the selection task, be-
lief perseverance, and conjunction fallacy experiments, among oth-
ers.2 These experiments collectively suggest that believers often willfully 
protect their beliefs in some way that is intentionally motivated by their 
practical/pragmatic interests and that they are able to undermine coun-
terevidence that tells against false beliefs—often manifestly false 
beliefs—and inadequately supported beliefs. We see this sort of behavior 
beyond the lab all too often in both the public and the private spheres, 
and it should trouble us all, as it appears (at least prima facie) to be pro-
foundly irrational and potentially harmful behavior.
This phenomenon has come to be generally known as motivated irra-
tionality, and evidence denial is just a more specific form of such behavior. 
I suggest in this paper a model for evidence denial that explains this behav-
ior as a manifestation of rationality, and it is based on the contention 
that social values (measurable as utilities) often underwrite these sorts of 
responses. Moreover, I contend that the value associated with group mem-
bership in particular can override epistemic reason when the expected util-
ity of a belief  or belief  system is  great. It is also true, however, that it 
appears to be the case that it is still possible for such unreasonable believ-
ers to reverse this sort of dogmatism and change their beliefs in a way that 
is epistemically rational.3 The conjecture made here is that we should 
expect this to happen only when the expected utility of the beliefs in ques-
tion dips below a threshold where the utility value of continued dogma-
tism and the associated group membership is no longer sufficient to 
motivate defusing the counterevidence that tells against such epistemically 
irrational beliefs. On this basis I suggest that our interventions and 
attempts to affect such belief  changes must take the form of pointing out 
or creating negative social consequences for such continued commitment. 
It is important for us to undertake this sort of corrective instruction 
because these sorts of personal commitments can be publicly and person-
ally harmful. Interestingly, we shall also see that this problem is very 
closely related to the infamous Quine-Duhem thesis.
2 See Mantelow (2012) for a thorough summary of these results. Of particular interest 
here are the experiments related to evidence denial and belief  perseverance as illustrated in 
Anderson, Lepper, and Ross (1980), Lord, Ross, and Lepper (1979) and Ross, Lepper, and 
Hubbard (1975). In a historical sense this phenomenon is interestingly discussed by Peirce 
(1992) under the rubric of the method of tenacity.
3 This is issue is a matter of some controversy, especially as it pertains to the backfire ef-
fect. See, for example, Nyham and Reifler (2010), Druckamn (2012), Wood and Porter (forth-
coming), Rich and Zaragosa (2016), and Rich et al. (2017).
© 2019 Metaphilosophy LLC and John Wiley & Sons Ltd
565EVIDENCE DENIAL
Three Cases of Motivated Irrationality
To make this discussion more concrete, let me introduce three hypothet-
ical but all too real examples to illustrate the phenomenon of evidence 
denial.4
Joe Devout: Joe is a generally rational fellow reasoning under normal condi-
tions who is committed to the existence of the Christian God, understood to be 
omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent. Joe attaches great personal value 
to this commitment and to his membership in a community of people who are 
like-minded. His life is, in fact, importantly shaped around this commitment. 
One day, however, Joe notices that his conception of God is incompatible with 
the existence of evil, and he is clearly aware that there is a nearly limitless set 
of seemingly undeniably evil events that have occurred in the world. This is a 
problem because if  God is omniscient and omnipotent, then he knows of all 
these evils, and since he is omnibenevolent he should prevent them. So, Joe 
learns of a considerable body of evidence against the existence of such a being. 
But despite learning this he refuses to give up his ideological commitment, due 
to its great personal value, and to accomplish this refusal he asserts that there 
is in fact no evil in the world at all. He maintains his degree of commitment to 
the claim that the Christian God exists at the same degree prior to his learning 
the new bit of counterevidence.
In this case Joe learns of a body of facts that undermines his commitment 
to the ideologically grounded belief that the omnipotent, omniscient, 
and omnibenevolent God of orthodox Christianity exists. He becomes 
aware of the so-called problem of evil. Rather than acknowledge this 
evidence and update his beliefs appropriately, however, he uses his ideo-
logical commitment to dismiss the counterevidence so as to preserve his 
valued personal commitment.
Let’s consider this second similarly constructed case:
Jane Novax: Jane is a generally rational gal reasoning under normal condi-
tions who is committed to the claim that the standard regimen of childhood 
vaccinations significantly increases the chance of a child’s being autistic. She 
attaches great personal value to this commitment and to her membership in 
a community of people who are like-minded. Her life is, in fact, importantly 
shaped around this commitment. Jane notices, however, that there are no good 
studies in support of this claim and that there are very many reputable and 
reliable studies that demonstrate that the claim is almost certainly false. So, she 
has a considerable body of evidence against the claim that the standard regimen 
of childhood vaccinations increases the chance of a child’s being autistic. But 
she refuses to give up her ideological commitment to this claim on learning 
of this counterevidence, due to her commitment’s great personal value, and to 
4 In these cases the assumption is being made that the relevant commitments involved are 
non-evidence-based. This is, of course, likely an idealization with respect to real-world cases, 
but the formal model introduced here nevertheless illuminates the factors involved.
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accomplish her refusal she asserts that the studies are phony and are, in fact, 
part of a conspiracy perpetrated by the pharmaceutical companies to sell their 
products. So she uses her ideological commitment to establish that this appar-
ent counterevidence is not actually disconfirmatory and maintains her initial 
degree of commitment to the claim that the standard regimen of childhood 
vaccinations significantly increases the chance of a child’s being autistic.
In this case Jane learns of a body of facts that undermines her com-
mitment to the ideologically adopted claim that the standard regimen 
of childhood vaccinations is harmful and causally connected to the 
incidence of autism. Rather than acknowledge that evidence and make 
appropriate adjustments in her belief state, however, she uses her ideo-
logical commitment simply to neutralize the counterevidence by con-
cocting a conspiracy theory.
Finally, consider a third, slightly different sort of case:
Donald Denier: Donald is a generally rational fellow reasoning under nor-
mal conditions who is committed to the claim that climate change is not the 
result of the human use of fossil fuels. He attaches great personal value to this 
commitment and to his membership in a community of people who are like-
minded. His life is, in fact, importantly shaped around this commitment. He 
notices, however, that there are very few studies in support of this claim and 
that they are all of questionable quality. Moreover, there are very many repu-
table and reliable studies that demonstrate that it is overwhelmingly likely that 
climate change is the result of the human use of fossil fuels. So, Donald has a 
considerable body of evidence for the claim that climate change is the result of 
the human use of fossil fuels. But he refuses to give up his ideological commit-
ment to this claim, due to its great personal value, and to accomplish his refusal 
he asserts that the studies that serve as counterevidence are phony and are, in 
fact, part of a conspiracy perpetrated by liberals. He adopts the position that 
the supposed counterevidence is not actually disconfirmatory and increases the 
degree of his commitment to the claim that that climate change is not the result 
of the human use of fossil fuels, rather than reducing his degree of confidence 
in that claim.
Notice that unlike the agents in the Joe Devout and Jane Novax cases, 
in Donald Denier the agent in question does not simply maintain his 
level of commitment to the claim in question in response to the counter-
evidence he becomes aware of. Rather, Donald increases his degree of 
commitment to this claim upon learning the counterevidence. Thus, this 
case is designed to represent the salient facts involved in cases of what is 
known as the backfire effect. Not only does Donald ignore evidence on 
the basis of his ideological commitment, he also strengthens that com-
mitment in response to compelling counterevidence.
So what are we to make of these sorts of cases? Are the agents 
involved simply stupid, stubborn, or irrational? Are they simply violating 
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fundamental epistemic rules or is something more pernicious and subtle 
going on? In order to address and perhaps correct these sorts of behav-
iors involving such putative irrationality we need first to find a reasonable 
explanation of just what is going on in these sorts of cases of evidence 
denial. Let us begin, then, with a brief  examination of the concept of 
rationality and some associated issues involving human cognitive behavior 
in order to make some sense of these sorts of cases.
Rationality, Belief Revision, and Conditionalization
At least since Aristotle boldly proclaimed that man is a rational animal, 
philosophers have typically assumed that humans are by and large ratio-
nal beings, and this is supported by a compelling form of the Davidsonian 
principle of charity, which asserts that we ought to prefer explanations 
of human behavior that treat our behaviors as rational, at least when 
it is possible to do so. Let us call this assumption the rationality the-
sis. Of course, there has been ongoing philosophical debate both about 
just which principles make up human rationality and about how well 
we collectively meet those norms of reasoning in our cognitive endeav-
ors. So, let us call the first project—that of determining which principles 
constitute human rationality—the normative project, and let us call the 
second project—that of determining how rational humans are relative 
to some identified standard—the descriptive project. It should be clear, 
then, that, so understood, the descriptive project depends on the norma-
tive project, and that the rationality thesis involves the assumption that 
human rationality is constituted by some set of principles of good reason 
that we all exhibit and that we typically conform to, even if we some-
times make errors in reasoning. But this way of looking at the matter 
immediately invites addressing the normative project. We cannot fairly 
assess the status of the rationality thesis via confronting the descriptive 
project without understanding first what constitutes the best normative 
model of human rationality.
The prevailing—or even orthodox—model of human rationality takes 
an agent’s epistemically rational behavior to involve belief  change and 
creedal states (both synchronic and diachronic) that conform to normative 
principles governing belief  revision and the probabilistic credences agents 
attach to such beliefs. There are, of course, numerous technical problems 
involved in both of these key components of the orthodox model, and 
they are at best complementary, since they cannot easily be integrated, but 
the model is assumed to be correct in principle. Let us look briefly at the 
most prominent theory of belief  revision. Carlos Alchourrón, Peter 
Gärdenfors, and David Makinson developed the AGM (Alchourrón-
Gärdenfors-Makinson) theory of belief  revision in the 1980s, and a num-
ber of related theories have arisen as a consequence.5 These theories are 
5 See Alchourrón, Gärdenfors, and Makinson (1985), Gärdenfors (1988), and Levi (1996).
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fundamentally based on the concept of a belief  state, a belief  set, or a 
corpus of beliefs, K, typically satisfying the following minimal conditions 
(where it is assumed that belief  states are given a representation in some 
language L):
• (Df BS) A set of sentences, K, is a belief state if and only if (i) K is con-
sistent and (ii) K is objectively closed under logical implication.
The content of a belief state is then defined as the set of logical conse-
quences of K. Given this basic form of epistemic representation, the 
AGM-type theories are intended to be normative theories about how a 
given belief state that satisfies the definition of a belief state is related to 
other belief states satisfying that definition relative to: (1) the addition of 
a new belief b to Ki or (2) the retraction of a belief b from Ki, where 
b ∈ Ki. Belief changes of the latter kind are termed contractions, but 
belief changes of the former kind must be further subdivided into those 
that require giving up some elements of Ki and those that do not. 
Additions of beliefs that do not require giving up previously held beliefs 
are termed expansions, and those that do are termed revisions.6
Given AGM-style theories, the supposed a priori grounded principles 
that govern the rational dynamics of beliefs are simply the epistemically 
normative rules that govern rational cases of contraction, revision, and 
expansion of belief  states. These rules are the AGM postulates, and the 
fundamental insight behind these theories is then that belief  changes 
should be fundamentally conservative in nature. In other words, in belief  
changes one ought to make the minimal alterations necessary to incorpo-
rate new information and ought to maintain or restore logical consistency. 
This fundamental assumption is supposed to be justified a priori in virtue 
of a principle of informational economy. This principle reflects the idea 
that information is intrinsically and practically valuable, and so we should 
retain it at all costs unless we are forced to do otherwise. So, while the 
details are not important here, the revision operations on belief  states are 
normatively restricted so as to obey a principle of minimal mutilation and 
a principle of consistency maintenance. But what about the credences that 
we attach to beliefs in the orthodox account of rationality? Creedal states 
are not mentioned in AGM models of belief, but they importantly reflect 
our degrees of confidence with respect to our beliefs. So, fleshing out the 
orthodox model requires supplementing the belief  revision theory with a 
theory of credences or of probabilistic rationality.
The orthodox model of probabilistic rationality that complements 
the orthodox model of belief  revision is Bayesianism (see Howson and 
Urbach [1993]). With respect specifically to creedal states (that is, our 
6 In point of fact, the AGM theory really holds only that there are two dynamical opera-
tions on belief  states, because revision is defined in terms of expansion and contraction.
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probabilistically graded partial beliefs) Bayesianism specifies well-known 
rules of probabilistic rationality, and the justification of these principles 
was traditionally secured in the a priori philosophical way, just as the 
belief  revision postulates. Specifically, our creedal states and their updat-
ing are supposed a priori to abide by conditionalization if  they are ratio-
nal. Conditionalization is understood as follows:
• (Conditionalization) P′(A) = P(A | e).
So understood, this principle says that upon learning evidence e at t, your 
new probability function P′(·) at t + 1 defined over your beliefs should be 
equal to the conditional probability of A given e at t. In other words, you 
should incorporate e into your initial creedal belief state at t and adjust 
the probabilities defined over your partial beliefs appropriately to yield 
a new rational probability function at t + 1 obeying the axioms of the 
probability calculus. More specifically, the conditional probability of A 
given e is defined a priori by Bayes’ Theorem as follows:
• (Bayes’ Theorem) P(A|e) = P(A)P(e|A)/P(e).
Together conditionalization and Bayes’ Theorem yield a potent norma-
tive theory of synchronic and diachronic probabilistic rationality. They 
tell what creedal states we ought to have, given our evidence. So, given 
the orthodox model of rationality, if we are to be rational, every time a 
new bit of evidence comes in we are supposed to revise our belief system 
to incorporate that datum and then adjust our creedal states with respect 
to our belief states according to Bayesian conditionalization. Now, if we 
look at the Joe Devout, Jane Novax, and Donald Denier cases through 
the lens of the orthodox model, it looks clear that Joe, Jane, and Donald 
are irrational. Each of them appears to violate the normative principles 
that constitute this model of rationality, and it would seem to be the 
case that we should just educate them and perhaps present them with 
further counterevidence in order to effect rational revision of their belief 
and creedal states. But, as we shall see, things are far more complex and 
subtle than this.
The Experimental Challenge to the Orthodox Model
To begin to see this, let us first remind ourselves that there is currently 
a large body of troubling experimental results that appear to have bear-
ing on this particular model of human rationality and on the rationality 
thesis in general. What is most interesting about this particular issue is 
that it has rarely been the case that philosophers and psychologists who 
have been involved as disputants in either or both of the normative and 
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descriptive debates have challenged the rationality thesis itself. This is in 
part the result of the lingering essentialism of the Aristotelian version of 
the rationality thesis. For Aristotle it was a matter of philosophical defi-
nition that humans are rational. Man is, by definition, a rational animal. 
In other words, we are essentially rational beings such that if we were to 
lose our capacity for being rational we would no longer qualify as human 
except in a purely nominal sense. In fact, Aristotle tells us straightfor-
wardly that a human whose desires and appetites subordinate his or her 
reason literally becomes a beast and not a human in terms of function. 
So, according to this view, we are all necessarily rational in principle, 
and this is because on the traditional view the rationality thesis has been 
taken to be a purely philosophical, definitional, and a priori matter. As 
a result, the matter of the truth of the rationality thesis is supposed to be 
totally insulated from the world of empirical results. If one grants this 
philosophical assumption, then the normative project is just the project 
of analyzing the specific content of the concept of human rationality via 
the a priori methods of philosophy, and it is just a given that all humans 
are rational.
What is of particularly great interest here, then, is that beginning in the 
1960s a number of psychologists began to conduct experimental studies of 
human rationality and in so doing changed the methodological dynamic 
associated with this issue. Most notorious in this regard were the various 
studies conducted by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky and by Peter 
Wason and Philip Johnson-Laird.7 What these and other psychologists 
ultimately found in their experiments was, at the time, quite startling. In 
effect, they found that actual human reasoning apparently fails to con-
form to the basic capacities that had been assumed to be part of human 
rational ability in the philosophical sense. This was shown to be true with 
respect to core aspects of inductive, deductive, and abductive reasoning. 
But what is most interesting about this story is that a number of these 
researchers then concluded on the basis of the sum total of the results of 
experiments of these types that the extent of human rationality is, at very 
least, far more restricted than philosophical models of rationality had 
assumed. They did not, then, merely use empirical methods to address the 
descriptive project, and they were not content to simply claim that the 
results showed that we do not meet the norms of human rationality in 
many particular cases of thinking. Rather, what they concluded was the 
altogether more radical claim that the rationality thesis itself  was false, 
and so concluded that the normative project is itself  radically misguided. 
Essentially their argument amounts to the claim that humans’ ability to 
reason diverges so systematically from any proposed norms offered up in 
7 See Kahneman and Tversky (1979), Kahneman and Tversy (1982), Kahneman and 
Tversky (1996), Wason (1968a, 1968b, 1968c, and 1977), Wason and Johnson-Laird (1970), 
and Johnson-Laird and Wason (1977).
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the philosophical analyses of human rationality that we should simply 
reject the rationality thesis lock, stock, and barrel. Aristotle was just 
wrong, philosophers do not know what they are talking about, and we are 
fundamentally irrational beings.
So the contemporary debate about human rationality crucially turns 
on a large body of experimental data concerning epistemic performance. 
On the one hand, it seems that these systematic and widespread failures on 
the part of humans to meet the philosophically established norms of good 
reasoning may, when suitably interpreted and correctly marshaled, imply 
that humans are not as rational as traditionally assumed. On the other 
hand, perhaps they can be explained away in some manner that preserves 
the idea that we are, at least mostly, rational. This second line of thought 
needs to be considered in a bit more detail at this juncture, and it is a desir-
able alternative in that it preserves the broad assessment of humans as 
rational and helps us to make sense of their behavior. So in order to make 
sense of this alternative, it is useful to introduce a particular conceptual 
distinction. There are two distinct ways in which we can view the sorts of 
errors that appear to be present in these sorts of experiments, and a useful 
way to look at them derives from Noam Chomsky’s work in linguistics. 
In explaining how we use language successfully despite the fact that we 
often make mistakes, Chomsky (1975 and 1986) introduced the distinc-
tion between performance and competence. For example, we are competent 
speakers of English despite the fact that we often make grammatical errors 
in our speaking and writing. Competence, then, is a matter of our ideal 
functioning with respect to linguistic use, whereas performance is a matter 
of our actual track record in following and/or applying the constitutive 
principles of a language in practice. Performance errors are specifically 
supposed to occur when we are tired, when we are distracted, when other 
cognitive systems interfere with our linguistic processing, and so on. Such 
errors occur due to psychological and situational interference not under 
our control. But so long as the errors in question are not systemic and 
uncorrectable in better conditions, such results need not be taken to neg-
atively impact the claim that humans possess linguistic competence. It is 
just that sometimes external factors beyond our control adversely impact 
our linguistic performance.
The structure of the debate about human rationality suggests that we 
might apply this sort of distinction in the case of the disparity between the 
normative principles of rationality and our actual reasoning. In essence, 
we might say that we have a certain sort of rational and ideal competence 
with respect to the constitutive principles of rationality despite the fact 
that we sometimes make errors in actual reasoning due to external factors 
beyond our direct control. Thus one can seemingly preserve the claim that 
we are rational even in the presence of errors, especially if  such errors are 
not systemic and uncorrectable. But the problem that this paper focuses 
on arises despite this clever defense of the claim that humans are rational 
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in light of empirically established errors in reasoning. Specifically, in the 
context of motivated irrationality things are a bit more complicated, and 
what we shall find is that it is much more reasonable and constructive 
to believe that rational commitment involves nonepistemic factors that, if  
ignored, mislead us about the nature of evidence denial. So, really, the 
problem that must be addressed here concerns what we should say about 
the cognitive behavior of people who willfully reason in ways that violate 
the principles that are constitutive of rational competence. These people 
are not seemingly making mistakes because of external factors beyond 
their control that cause their reasoning to deviate from ideal competence. 
Rather, they are choosing to intentionally violate those rules. Specifically, 
the problem to be addressed involves a form of what has come to be called 
motivated irrationality, and it is based on the idea that ideologically driven 
thinkers sometimes consciously and intentionally violate the rules that 
are constitutive of human rational competence in order to preserve their 
ideological beliefs. Often they knowingly ignore or defuse counterevidence 
and counterarguments that negatively implicate their ideological commit-
ments. Sometimes, in fact, the degree of commitment to such ideological 
beliefs knowingly increases in response to such negative evidence. This 
latter, more specific, phenomenon is known as the backfire effect. What 
I shall suggest here is, first, that such motivated irrationality is rationally 
accomplished by appeal to specific kind of value that ideologically driven 
thinkers attach to ideological commitments and not by appeal to the epis-
temic status of such commitments. In essence, they defuse counterevidence 
by appeal to a form of rational decision making. Second, I shall suggest 
that the proper sorts of interventions that will predictably fix this sort of 
irrationality do not involve purely or even primarily epistemic interven-
tions. This implies that the orthodox model of rationality is importantly 
deficient in the sense that it treats the notion of rational commitment as 
a purely epistemic matter and in doing so would force us to understand 
evidence denial as a failure of epistemic rationality in a way that fails to 
capture the most salient feature of that phenomenon (that is, the role of 
pragmatic considerations in rational commitment).
So, at least from the perspective of the orthodox model of rationality, 
this sort of relatively common bad epistemic behavior presents us with 
something of a puzzle. This is because of the following considerations. 
First, the cognitive agents in these situations appear to be in an epistemic 
position to believe what the evidence warrants, but they choose to do other-
wise, in violation of the orthodox model of rationality. Second, they appear 
to hold evidence contravening beliefs on the basis of what sometimes 
appear to be nonepistemic reasons. As a result, what is common to all three 
cases is the idea that the agents involved value their respective ideological 
commitments in a nonepistemic and contra-evidential manner—they spe-
cifically derive great value from being members of communities of like-
minded thinkers despite the counterevidence they possess—and in so doing 
© 2019 Metaphilosophy LLC and John Wiley & Sons Ltd
573EVIDENCE DENIAL
are able to resist the proper normative implications of the counterevidence 
they become aware of. This immediately and unambiguously suggests that 
those commitments are not purely functions of their epistemic states. 
Rather, such agents seem to be basing their commitments, at least in part, 
on important and potent nonepistemic factors. Specifically, they appear to 
be basing their commitments on the expected utilities of those commit-
ments, specifically expected utilities that are importantly linked to group-
think. Failure to appreciate this take on the matter would force us to 
conclude that these agents are simply irrational in the sense that they fail to 
possess rational competence or in the sense that they are merely making 
performance errors with respect to the orthodox principles of rationality. 
But as the stories are set up the agents involved are generally rational and 
not subject to external factors that cause them to make performance errors. 
So this does not seem to be right, and it would require attributing wide-
spread failures of rational competence and/or performance that are not 
easily explained and that would violate the principle of charity when it 
comes to their cognitive behavior.8 Let us, then, turn our attention to devel-
oping a better explanation of these sorts of cases in light of what we have 
learned about rationality in general and what we have conjectured about 
cases of evidence denial.
Explaining Evidence Denial and the Quine-Duhem Thesis
In the Joe, Jane, and Donald cases the agents learn of evidence e that 
bears on an ideological commitment A such that:
• (Counter Evidence) P(A|e) < P(A).
This is just the standard probabilistic notion of disconfirming evidence. 
As we have already seen, however, in light of this situation the agents 
ought rationally to conditionalize and accept that e is disconfirming 
evidence with respect to A so that P′(A) < P(A). But none of the agents 
in the three cases does this, and one might be tempted to claim that 
all three agents are just irrational in the sense of failing to possess the 
proper competence and leave it at that. They all just need to be corrected 
and learn to properly employ the postulates of AGM belief revision and 
Bayesian conditionalization. But this is an entirely unnuanced response, 
and it does not reveal precisely how these agents—each of whom appears 
to be otherwise rationally competent and free from external factors that 
might cause performance errors—manage to do this. What will be sug-
gested here is that it is plausible to suppose that the agents in our three 
cases adopt one of the following principles with respect to e’s being dis-
confirming evidence for A:
8 See Davidson (1973 and 1974) on the problems with doing this.
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• (Ideological Immunization—1) (EV(A) > δ) & [(EV(A) > δ) → 
(A → ¬e)].
• (Ideological Immunization—2) (EV(A) > δ) & {(EV(A) > δ) → 
¬[(P(A|e) < P(A)]}.
That is to say that these agents hold that when the expected value of A 
exceeds some crucial threshold and in virtue of the value that A has, A 
implies either that e is false or that e does not disconfirm A.9 In effect, on 
either one or the other of these bases, they deny that e is really counter-
evidence with respect to A because of the value that A has. Alternatively, 
agents of these sorts may accept that e is disconfirming (but not refuting) 
evidence for A where A has a high expected value, but upon learning e 
the agent increases his or her valuation of A in order to maintain 
or even strengthen that commitment. Call this notion Ideological 
Immunization—3, and it is a more specific version of Ideological 
Immunization—2. All three of these curious but illuminating strategies 
identify ideological commitments as something more than epistemic 
commitments. Specifically, they all involve expected values, and this is 
the key to the problem of understanding what is going on in the Joe, 
Jane, and Donald vignettes.
What, then, is the expected value of a proposition? According to stan-
dard decision theory, the expected value of a proposition is understood as 
follows:
• (Expected Value) EV(A) = P(A) × U(A).
This just tells us that the expected value of a proposition is the prod-
uct of its probability and its subjective utility, where subjective utilities 
are just reflections of rational personal preferences. The rationality of 
such preferences is merely the internal coherence of such values, and this 
is reflected in the axioms of decision-theoretic utility that assure that 
such preferences are, for example, transitive. So, any claim with a non-
zero probability and a nonzero utility of this sort will have a nonzero 
expected value. But since expected values are mathematical products, 
a claim with a marginal probability can still have a very large expected 
value when its subjective utility is great. Of course, this is typically true 
of ideological commitments of the sort at issue here. This realization is 
crucially important to the matter at hand. It is simply too naïve to claim 
that the agents in the Joe, Jane, and Donald cases are just irrational in 
9 The issue of just what the threshold value is may vary from individual to individual, 
owing to the fundamental nature of utilities (that is, they are measures of rational subjective 
preference). But, that said, the reasonable conjecture made here is that the threshold can be 
found where the value of group membership that is conferred by adoption of the commit-
ment in question is significantly greater than the value of having the relevant true 
commitment.
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the ordinary sense of broad competence or performance. They are pos-
sessed of basic logical and probabilistic competence and are not making 
errors due to external factors like tiredness, and so forth. Their behav-
ior is both more intentional and cleverer than that, and correcting such 
behavior crucially requires understanding this, especially since all three 
of the ideological immunization strategies can be repeatedly employed 
to defuse virtually any counterevidence that could be brought to bear 
against their commitments simply by ratcheting up their assessments of 
the utility of those commitments. So, the agents’ apparent dogmatism 
is consciously motivated, sinisterly rational, and often very effective, 
and we should understand that in cases like these we are really dealing 
with motivated pragmatically rational epistemic irrationality. It is, then, 
also deeply interesting to note that this sort of epistemically irratio-
nal behavior is importantly related to Quine’s particular version of the 
Quine-Duhem thesis. In its simplest guise, Quine’s version of the thesis 
incorporates two components. First, it involves conformational holism. 
This just means that counterevidence is counterevidence only with 
respect to a total body of beliefs that are assumed in a conformational/
disconfirmational context. Second, it involves the contention that any 
claim may be retained in light of apparent refutation from counterevi-
dence by making appropriate changes in one’s standing body of beliefs 
(see Quine [1951] and Sanford [2017]). Both of these subtheses are deeply 
important to the notions of theory confirmation, theory refutation, and 
rational belief in general, and they are crucial to the sort of evidence 
denial that is the central topic of this paper. As Quine claims,
The totality of our so-called knowledge or beliefs, from the most casual matters 
of geography and history to the profoundest laws of atomic physics or even of 
pure mathematics and logic, is a man-made fabric which impinges on experi-
ence only along the edges. Or, to change the figure, total science is like a field of 
force whose boundary conditions are experience. A conflict with experience at 
the periphery occasions readjustments in the interior of the field. But the total 
field is so underdetermined by its boundary conditions, experience, that there 
is much latitude of choice as to what statements to reevaluate in the light of 
any single contrary experience. No particular experiences are linked with any 
particular statements in the interior of the field, except indirectly through con-
siderations of equilibrium affecting the field as a whole. (1951, 42–43)
Notice, then, that given Quine’s version of the Quine-Duhem thesis believ-
ers can voluntarily revise their beliefs/commitments to prevent refutation 
in a variety of ways that need not abide by the orthodox principles of 
rationality.10 So, Quine and like-minded thinkers appear to be committed 
10 Quine (1995) is clear that one can adjust one’s total commitments in light of apparent 
refutation in any number of ways. Importantly, one can, in principle, reject the counterevi-
dence to defuse any such refutation.
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to a form of direct doxastic voluntarism, the view that we have direct vol-
untary control over what we believe, and they allow, then, for the possibil-
ity that we can voluntarily commit/decommit ourselves to propositions 
and in so doing can defuse apparent refutations of any belief  either by 
contracting with respect to the counterevidence or by revising/expanding 
our beliefs so as to defuse the refutation (for example, by constructing an 
appropriate conspiracy theory). So, these defenders of the Quine-Duhem 
thesis allow that we can at least sometimes efficaciously choose to disbe-
lieve propositions that negatively impact our other beliefs, including coun-
terevidence itself. But this leaves the question of the rationality of such 
maneuvers unexplained, poorly explained, or perhaps even inexplicable in 
terms of the orthodox model of rationality. As we have seen, however, this 
sort of cognitive phenomenon is totally explainable and even predictable 
in terms of the hybrid model of motivated irrationality suggested here. 
Something like Quine’s own notion of entrenchment is at work in cases of 
evidence denial when we understand entrenchment as a pragmatically 
rational phenomenon, and this allows us to see that there is a fully under-
standable but not entirely orthodox notion of rational commitment 
involved in denying evidence. In any case, with this explanation in hand we 
can consider the final piece of the puzzle: How should we critically deal 
with evidence denial and evidence deniers?
Conclusion: Inflating the Cost of Irrationality
The answer to this question is to be found in the hybrid explanatory 
model of the Joe, Jane, and Donald cases. First, in virtue of the general 
moral principle that we have a duty to prevent avoidable and unnecessary 
harms (that is, the principle of nonmalfeasance), we have an obligation 
ourselves to try to prevent the sorts of harmful irrationality exhibited in 
those cases, and the efficacious way to accomplish this good is revealed 
via the explanations of ideological immunization involved in evidence 
denial offered earlier. Specifically, it should be clear that the sort of mo-
tivated irrationality exhibited by Joe, Jane, and Donald depends deeply 
on groupthink. That is how the personal value of their commitments is 
grounded and maintained (via the utility of group membership). In vir-
tue of this value derived from and reinforced by group membership the 
expected values of certain sorts of ideological commitments are used to 
protect such commitments from rational refutation or disconfirmation. 
But, as we have seen, we should not succumb to the temptation to label 
these sorts of behaviors as blanket indicators of epistemic irrationality 
with respect to the orthodox model either in the sense of lack of compe-
tence or in terms of performance errors. Rather, we should understand 
that subjects like Joe, Jane, and Donald do satisfy the rationality thesis 
but exhibit a hybrid form of rationality that in part depends on nonepis-
temic and distinctly pragmatic factors.
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So, it would appear to be the case that it is these latter factors with 
which we must contend if  we are to correct such bad and harmful cogni-
tive behavior. But there is hope here too. As recent studies have shown, 
agents who exhibit behavior of the sort involved in evidence denial and/or 
the backfire effect can sometimes be brought back into accord with the 
canons of epistemic rationality, but not merely by piling on more epis-
temic criticism or providing epistemic instruction.11 The conjecture made 
here is that such corrective alterations in epistemic behavior can be 
expected to happen only when we can reduce the expected value of an 
ideological commitment that is used to immunize that commitment from 
disconfirmation below the threshold that engages the ideological immuni-
zation strategy the agent is employing. As has been stressed here, however, 
it seems that this cannot be achieved by deploying merely epistemic 
resources and epistemic instruction. Rather, what we need to do instead is 
to focus specifically on the reduction of the value of those commitments, 
principally by inflating the costs of those commitments. This is likely best 
achieved by attacking the communities that give rise to the perceived value 
of those commitments or by showing that there is little value in belonging 
to such a group. In other words, we must make it socially undesirable to be 
members of those communities, and this suggests that the use of methods 
such as public ridicule, isolation, deprogramming, public awareness cam-
paigns, and so on will be far more effective in achieving the correction of 
such motivated irrationality than purely epistemic interventions. 
Essentially, if  we hope to correct these epistemic and moral wrongs, what 
we must do is reduce the expected values of the ideological commitments 
of these sorts of people below the tipping point where epistemic reason 
can take over and their rational epistemic competence is engaged.
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